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Abstract Digital platforms have begun to infuse the higher education landscape, merging 
commercial business models with existing political demands for universities to 
become more data-driven, competitive, and market-focused. This article presents 
a case study of the education business Pearson and its expansion of the digital 
platform as a model for global higher education reform. A key ‘edu-business’ in 
the ‘global education industry’, Pearson has pivoted to online program 
management platforms, on-demand digital learning platforms, and intensive 
mobilization of data analytics to enact its strategic business priorities. These 
market devices and strategies position Pearson as an authoritative source for both 
the evaluation of performance in HE and the valuation of HE as a market. The 
analysis foregrounds the micro-processes involved as Pearson has sought to 
make, exploit, and maintain market opportunities in HE, demonstrating how the 
market form of ‘platform capitalism’ is being reproduced by commercial power-
players in the global higher education industry. As a key device in the 
sociotechnical arrangement of markets, the digital platform is a participant in HE 
reforms that are intended to align the public mission of universities with the 
private interests of platform capitalism. 
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Contemporary higher education (HE) is undergoing significant transformations as 
digital technologies, data analytics, metrics and other techniques of evaluation are 
advanced across the sector by governmental and businesses actors. Processes of 
marketization, privatization and consumerization of HE mean universities are 
increasingly focused on achieving market value through competition, performance 
ranking, consumer demand, and return on investment (Busch, 2016), often enabled 
by digital technologies (Selwyn, 2014) and infrastructures of measurement (Sellar 
2017). Data, metrics, performance rankings and accountability ratings have become 
driving ‘engines’ of HE, cultivating powerful effects on how universities are 
evaluated and valued (Espeland & Sauder, 2016; Muller, 2017). To be competitive 
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under ‘quantitative control of the academy’ (Burrows, 2012, p.356), universities are 
encouraged to advance use of digital infrastructures and platforms, particularly by 
‘unbundling’ their services into component parts and exposing them to market 
forces for ‘rebundling’ by outsourced commercial companies (McCowan, 2017; 
Muellerleile & Lewis, 2019). Private digital providers have rapidly expanded across 
HE systems as part of a ‘global education industry’ (Verger, Steiner-Khamsi & 
Lubienski, 2017). Although HE reform remains a project of central government, 
its enactment is being dispersed to data infrastructures, digital platforms and the 
technology companies that produce them, with the support of a diverse cross-
sectoral array of ‘arms length’ HE agencies, think tanks, consultancies, private 
companies and coalitions (Williamson, 2019). Together, these organizations and 
technologies are making new digital markets for services and products in higher 
education, thereby reshaping universities, subjectivities, and the sector itself to act 
in more market-like ways (Komljenovic & Robertson, 2016). 
Although ‘marketization’ has a long history in HE, the novel digital developments 
advancing across universities demand critical analyses unpacking the specific 
market-making activities of major contemporary education businesses, and the 
emerging effects of these new markets on the sector. This article brings together 
studies of digital platforms with sociological approaches to markets as a framework 
to examine the platform-building and market-making activities of the education 
business Pearson. A global, multibillion dollar market actor, in recent years 
Pearson has pivoted to digital education products and services in its pursuit of new 
market opportunities (Junemann & Ball, 2015; Sellar & Hogan, 2019; Williamson, 
2016). Riep (2019, pp.408-409) sees Pearson as a ‘paradigmatic case’ of how ‘edu-
businesses attempt to legitimate and secure their profit-making activities in 
education’ and ‘advance capitalist restructuring in education’. It has developed a 
plethora of market devices and strategies to accomplish this aim, most notably 
digital platforms, as it seeks to transform HE into a market amenable to its 
expanding product portfolio. The aim of this article is to examine the specific role 
of digital platforms in the market expansion of multinational edu-businesses. 
With Pearson as the empirical focus, the article contributes to emerging research 
‘unpacking market-making processes’ and the complex social, political, economic 
and technical strategies and practical effort required for the design and 
maintenance of markets in higher education (Komljenovic & Robertson, 2017, 
p.289). Markets, in short, need to be made—in concrete contexts and conditions—
and their realization and maintenance includes the creation of particular products. 
Specifically, ‘market devices’ play key roles as tools, artefacts, objects, technologies, 
and material things that take part in the construction of markets (Muniesa, Millo & 
Callon, 2007). As Muniesa et al (2007, p.5) note, ‘The ways in which market 
devices are tinkered with, adjusted and calibrated affect the ways in which persons 
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and things are translated into calculative and calculable beings’. Put in the HE 
context, the ways market devices are configured can affect how universities, staff 
and students are translated into calculable objects, evaluated and ascribed value, 
with significant implications and effects on how they operate and function. As an 
agent of both ‘valuation’ and ‘evaluation’ (Lamont, 2012), Pearson participates in 
the evaluation of higher education, where universities are approached as 
competitive market actors seeking institutional advantage and position, and also in 
ascribing ‘value’ (usually monetary) to different practices and processes of HE.  
As an agent of (e)valuation in higher education, Pearson is seeking new ways of 
evaluating the worth of HE, creating monetary valuations of HE as a market, 
inserting new value-making products into the sector, and thereby reconfiguring HE 
itself. The analysis foregrounds the micro-processes involved as Pearson has 
sought to make, exploit, and maintain markets in HE, highlighting how 
marketization is accomplished through digital platforms and associated market 
devices, strategies and discourses. It is based on extensive examination of a large 
archive of documents and texts produced by Pearson in the period 2012 to 2019, 
as the company underwent strategic ‘digital transformation’ of its core business. 
The documents includes company annual reports, press releases, published 
interviews, company media coverage, in-house research reports, commissioned 
reports by external experts, market research findings, reports produced in 
partnership with other organizations, the company website, specific product 
webpages, and the Pearson blog. Five key market-making processes associated with 
digital platforms are identified, illuminating the painstaking work involved by a 
single edu-business to establish markets for and through digital platforms. The 
conclusion draws some critical implications about how digital platforms participate 
in HE marketization, and how market-making is remaking the sector to conform 
to the logics of ‘platform capitalism’.  
Platform edu-business 
‘Platform capitalism’ describes the business model and market form of the 
worldwide web since the appearance of digital platforms as the dominant spaces of 
capital accumulation on the internet (Srnicek, 2016). Platform-based businesses 
such as Google, Microsoft, Facebook, Apple and so on have attained 
unprecedented power to monitor, predict, and influence organizational, social, 
economic, political and human behaviours through the mass-scale extraction and 
use of digital data (Yeung, 2018). As Srnicek (2016, p.88) argues, through the 
appropriation of the ‘raw material’ of data, ‘the platform has become an 
increasingly dominant way of organizing businesses so as to monopolize these 
data, then extract, analyse, use and sell them’, enabling platform companies to 
become virtually monopolistic ‘owners of the infrastructures of society’ (p.92). For 
Fourcade and Healy (2017, p.10) the data industry has deepened the reach of the 
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market and defined new strategies of profit-making by turning ‘digital records’ into 
new sources of capital: 
As new techniques allow for the matching and merging of data from different sources, the 
results crystallize … into what looks like a supercharged form of capital. … [The] digital 
economy’s classificatory architecture allows market institutions to apprehend their clients, 
customers, or employees through new instruments of knowledge, efficiency and value 
extraction. Markets have learned to ‘see’ in a new way, and are teaching us to see ourselves 
in that way, too. 
Platforms that ‘see like a market’ by classifying, scoring and ranking individuals 
from their digital records have become the dominant means to the market 
ambitions and commercial advantage of technology companies.  
Understood as a socio-economic logic that imbues digital technologies, commands 
them to action, and changes the social worlds in which it intervenes, platform 
capitalism has begun to infuse the higher education landscape by merging with 
political demands for universities to become more data-driven, competitive, and 
market-focused. Technology businesses have recognized the market opportunities 
of HE, stimulated by multibillion dollar market valuations of the sector (HolonIQ, 
2018). A global industry of educational technologies has grown to encompass 
every aspect or ‘market segment’ of HE activity (Wiley, 2018), including 
recruitment, enrolment and admissions services; student management systems; 
core digital infrastructure; management dashboards and analytics platforms; 
learning management systems and virtual learning environments; digital library and 
information services; elearning software and courseware; learning analytics; online 
assessment; plagiarism detection; graduate talent analytics, alumni and graduate 
relationship management; and more. In Anglophone contexts especially, HE 
policies emphasize the necessity of collecting, analysing and using data to monitor 
and improve university performance (Williamson, 2019). Consequently, providers 
of ‘essential data solutions services’ have become competitive market actors 
(Robertson, 2019). Although the university has always adapted to the political 
economy and the wider technology environment, HE is now being exposed to new 
market forces and reassembled through digital technologies (Bacevic, 2019). 
In this context, the global education business Pearson has sought to establish itself 
as a global leader in ‘data-driven’, ‘digital-first’ education, with its own data 
analytics capacities, product development, evaluative devices, and market 
valuations (Williamson, 2016; Riep, 2019). Pearson has expanded as a global ‘edu-
business’ seeking new market niches for its products (Junemann & Ball, 2015) to 
become a globally integrated education services company centred on development 
and provision of digital learning platforms (Sellar & Hogan, 2019). Since 2012, its 
‘digital transformation strategy’ has moved the company’s priorities away from its 
traditional textbook and standardized assessment market, based on a business-to-
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business strategy of the company selling to institutions, to ‘digital first’ delivery and 
a direct-to-consumer market strategy (Pearson, 2018a). Its chief technology officer 
even terms it a ‘platform business’ (High, 2018). Its stated 2018 strategic priorities 
were to ‘grow market share through digital transformation’, which includes its 
higher education digital courseware platform, and ‘invest in structural growth 
markets’, including its Online Program Management (OPM) platform for HE 
institutions to deliver online degrees (Pearson, 2018a, p. 5), thereby enabling 
Pearson to both ‘shape the future of learning’ (p.18) and ‘lead and shape the 
market’ (p.20).  
To realize these ambitions, in 2019 Pearson announced the launch of the Global 
Learning Platform for delivery of ‘on-demand’ educational content, allowing 
students to ‘rent’ digital resources on a subscription basis, rather than purchase 
textbooks, through a business model emulating online ‘streaming’ services like 
Netflix and Spotify (Pearson, 2019). Likewise, Pearson’s OPM platform for digital 
and distance courses has become one of its main ‘growth market’ products. These 
developments are part of a digital portfolio of approximately 50 major products 
and services, alongside in-house research and evidence, that Pearson has sought to 
use ‘to resolve contradictions linked to education commercialisation by 
demonstrating the “measurable impact” and “outcomes” resulting from its 
educational products and services and communicating that to customers, 
shareholders, policymakers, state managers and partners’ (Riep, 2019, p. 407). Its 
platforms also incorporate its market strategies in software, code and algorithms.  
Across the HE industry, companies like Pearson are repositioning themselves to 
adopt the model of the platform, bringing about a new market form of the 
‘platform edu-business’ which ‘sees’ HE as a market, seeks capital from the digital 
records of universities, and aims to open up new market opportunities for platform 
products by changing how the sector operates. Pearson’s platform products are key 
market devices for the company, which it is mobilizing to create new markets in 
HE. Pearson’s ambition to shape the future of learning and shape markets 
simultaneously through digital platform technologies is the core focus of the 
following examination of the micro-processes of market-making in higher 
education.  
Market-making  
The making of markets is a core focus of the sociology of markets, particularly in 
the ‘performative school of thought’ which views ‘economic action as a result of 
calculative processes involving the specific technologies and artifacts that actors 
employ’ (Fligstein & Dauter, 2007, p. 3). From the performative view of 
marketization, Çalışkan and Callon (2010) argue that making markets depends on a 
heterogeneous arrangement of rules and conventions, technical devices, metric 
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systems, calculating equipment, logistical infrastructures, texts, technical and 
scientific knowledge, and human competencies and skills. Their programme for 
empirical investigation of the performativity of marketization highlights the things 
in the market, agencies, encounters, prices and market maintenance, and they 
define ‘the study of marketization as the entirety of efforts aimed at describing, 
analysing and making intelligible the shape, constitution and dynamics of a market 
sociotechnical arrangement’ (Çalışkan & Callon 2010, p. 3). In the performative 
sense, market-making involves ‘incorporation into algorithms, procedures, 
routines, and material devices’ (Mackenzie, p. 19), where market devices all play a 
part in shaping the construction of markets. The central insight of the sociology of 
markets—that markets have to be made, including the construction of practical 
devices and technologies, and that they then exert real effects, that is, they are 
performative—has catalysed significant efforts to unpack market-making processes 
in fine-grained empirical detail (Muniesa et al, 2007). 
Çalışkan and Callon (2010) identify five micro-processes and sociotechnical 
dynamics of market-making for empirical examination. The first micro-process of 
‘pacifying goods’ refers to how things and services are represented as describable 
and predictable ‘packages’ with fixed qualities to which value and price can be 
attached. Second, ‘marketizing agencies’ refer to the actors competing to define 
what is a valuable good or service, which takes place among people, technologies, 
laws, and forms of calculation. Marketizing agencies include human actors such as 
market analysts, but also computer software, business strategies, and private 
company support. Third, ‘market encounters’ refer to how agencies and goods 
meet one another, trade shows, conferences, seminars and other events, as well as 
through social media, web pages and other online and material arrangements. 
Fourth, ‘price-setting’ for a good or service is established through struggles 
between the different agencies that encounter each other, such as determining how 
much to sell or buy a service or product. And finally, the micro-processes of 
market-making, design, implementation, management, and maintenance describe 
how various elements are brought into being and reproduced to enable ongoing 
stability, continued extraction of profits, and efficient value-for-money use of 
resources. 
From the perspective of market sociology, platform capitalism itself needs to be 
understood as the product of myriad interacting market devices, techniques and 
strategies, principal along them the technological form of the platform itself. As 
sociotechnical market devices that ‘do things’, ‘act’ or ‘make others act’ (Musinesa 
et al. 2007, p.2), digital platforms create new kinds of market behaviours, relations 
and transactions, changing how people and organizations see and act (Fourcade & 
Healy, 2017). Technologies, such as digital platforms, are the material 
infrastructure of calculation necessary to market-making in platform capitalism.  
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Following this performative, sociotechnical orientation to the study of market 
devices and arrangements in the HE context, Komljenovic and Robertson (2016) 
argue that HE markets do not simply appear as the outcome of market ideology or 
policy interference, but are instead continually made and remade, as new products 
and services are imagined, invented, implemented, or vetoed. As ‘markets are made 
in, for and through higher education’, these ‘market-making processes are 
recalibrating and remaking structures, social relations and subjectivities, within and 
beyond the university, in turn reconstituting the university and the higher 
education sector’ (Komljenovic & Robertson, 2016, p. 623). The formerly non-
market space of higher education has been reframed as an ‘education services 
market’ by a ‘global HE industry’, which has introduced ‘HE market devices’ such 
as digital platforms, infrastructures, data and metrics into HE as ways of making 
new markets (Komljenovic & Robertson, 2017). Market-making in HE involve 
considerable ‘investment’ by policymakers, politicians, investment advisors, 
education firms, and universities, but also involves the mundane practicalities of 
creating higher education products and services that can be exchanged in a range 
of marketplaces. As such, understanding HE marketization requires not just macro 
analysis of political ideology, but micro analysis of the practical, material, technical 
and discursive effort of market-making and maintenance. 
These empirical vantage points on the construction and performativity of markets 
provide a framework for examining the emerging role of platform edu-businesses 
in the practices and processes of HE marketization. Focusing empirically on five 
key ways in which Pearson enacts digital platforms as market devices, the following 
sections reveal how Pearson is involved in the sociotechnical dynamics of HE 
market-making and, more widely, how digital market devices fuse HE to the 
market dynamics of platform capitalism. 
Numerical valuation 
The first dynamic of marketization in which Pearson is a major actor is the 
construction of numbers as a way of attaching valuations to platform products. 
Numbers act as ‘cognitive frames’ that market actors use to justify their strategies, 
investments and products (Verger et al, 2017). Pearson’s core business model in 
HE depends on producing goods and services in which it hopes universities will 
invest in order to secure it market share. Numbers support such marketization 
processes, since ‘services are framed with a view to objectifying and transforming 
them into packages, “things” which can be valued’ by being made ‘describable and 
predictable’, and which thus require ‘the implementation of specific socio-technical 
arrangements’ (Çalışkan & Callon, 2010, p.7). Numerical devices enable Pearson to 
stabilize and pacify its new digital platform services as packages with fixed qualities 
to which value (monetary and educational) can be attached.  
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Pearson’s business fortunes have fluctuated considerably in recent years, with 
£2billion wiped from its stock market value in 2017 after issuing a 2-year profit 
warning (Sweney, 2017). Its subsequent annual reports have provided highly 
detailed enumerative accounts of its market recovery strategy, including financial 
summaries and future profit projections based on its ‘digital transformation’ 
(Pearson, 2018a, p.45), which includes pivoting to ‘digital first’ services, scaling 
back its print textbook business, and selling its K-12 product portfolio (Wan 
2019a). From 2013, Pearson began investing in digital platforms and data services, 
and concentrated on growing its core business in HE online program management 
infrastructure, digital courseware, alternative models of HE provision, and the use 
data analytics in the universities sector, with the expectation of becoming 
profitable in these areas by 2020-21 (Wan, 2018). Its annual reports detailing its 
company value, financial performances, forecast future profit and strategic 
priorities are, then, powerful market devices which ‘stabilize’ the company through 
the careful packaging and framing of numbers and valuations, thereby making its 
future financial performance ‘predictable’ for its shareholders, stock market 
observers, and business media commentators.   
The generation of numbers also enables Pearson to present its customer markets in 
terms of specific valuations. Pearson commissions and conducts quantitative 
market research in order to detect and adapt to changing market trends in higher 
education. Market research surveys are a powerful form of market device for 
forecasting economic behaviour during the construction of markets (Muniesa et al, 
2007). In 2018, Pearson commissioned a global market research firm to conduct a 
‘Global Learner Survey’—with a sample of 11,000 in 19 countries—so as to better 
understand ‘the next generation of learners’ (Pearson, 2018b). These statistical 
market research data have enabled Pearson to frame its potential market 
consumers as ‘Gen Z’, with describable educational values and expectations that 
Pearson has fixed into place as statistically significant evidence through graphs, 
numbers and infographics. The findings translate students’ educational values into 
numerical values, while providing quantified intelligence for the company in setting 
strategies for market growth. The final findings, reported in 2019, were packaged 
up as a glossy website rich with data visualizations, and marketed on social media 
to circulate as an authoritative source of quantitative evidence on student 
expectations of HE, careers in the ‘talent economy’, and lifelong digitally-enhanced 
learning (https://www.pearson.com/news-and-research/the-future-of-
education/global-learner-survey.html).  
As a market device, the Gen Z numbers are ‘presented as “scientific” facts that 
intervene in the construction of markets’ (Riep, 2017, p.354). Likewise, in its 2018 
annual report, its strategic priorities for product development were based on 
quantitative ‘market trends’ that Pearson identified as ‘the rise of choice’ among 
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‘Gen Z’ consumers, greater ‘technology-enhancement’ of teaching, more ‘flexible’ 
pathways through higher education, and more demands for ‘career-driven learning’ 
(Pearson, 2018a, p. 16). Reflecting recent policy preoccupations with the ‘student-
consumer’ as an ‘active service-user’ of HE (Tomlinson, 2017, p. 457), Pearson’s 
market strategies bring together statistical survey findings and corporate objectives 
to frame a stabilized consumer on which financial profit projections and 
performance forecasts may be made.  
The enumerative framing of its customers also then permits Pearson to make new 
operational investments—ultimately incorporating its company beliefs about its 
customer market in software products. To bring the Gen Z consumer market into 
being Pearson has sought to package up its new ‘digital-first’ services and platform 
as saleable market products. With the Global Learner Survey indicating growth in 
students’ use of online video and subscription services for learning, the company 
has developed a social media streaming model for direct-to-consumer delivery of 
educational content. Its Global Learning Platform has been presented by company 
executives as appealing to the ‘the Spotify generation’ of ‘Gen Z’ students who will 
themselves ‘pay for use. They don’t want to buy to own, and they only want to pay 
to use things that are directly relevant to their course and their outcomes’ (Wan, 
2018). The Global Learning Platform is ‘an engine that will enable Pearson and its 
partners to launch personalized learning experiences more quickly and with better 
outcomes’, allowing the company to also update educational content in ‘real-time’ 
(Pearson, 2019). As a market device incorporating the company’s market ambitions 
in software and algorithms, the Global Learning Platform also enables Pearson to 
operate ‘on an economy of scale, indispensable for businesses that only enter a 
sector if profit may be made’ (Verger et al, 2017, p. 328). 
Pearson has turned directly to Silicon Valley’s key platform businesses for 
inspiration for the platform. Its chief technology officer claims:  
‘Silicon Valley companies create the benchmark for the digital experience by being 
platform businesses. Our vision is to leverage the opportunity to transform along similar 
lines in terms of having a single platform globally that … would allow us to move into a 
more personalized experience that delivers high-quality education outcomes. It would be 
game-changing for not only Pearson, but for the entire industry if we could create that 
single platform, similar to Netflix, Spotify, and Amazon’. (High, 2018) 
The market logic of platform capitalism characteristic of Silicon Valley companies 
combines with Pearson’s market growth strategy in its Global Learning Platform. 
The platform is a stabilized market device arranged from many heterogeneous 
sociotechnical elements: statistical market survey data, market trends intelligence, 
profit projections, social media business models, seductive discourses, and digital 
technologies. The lines of numbers in its annual reports and market surveys find 
their realization through incorporation in the lines of software code and algorithms 
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that enact its Global Learning Platform as an ‘engine’ of ‘personalized learning 
experiences’ and ‘better outcomes’. In this sense, the construction of numerical 
values does considerable work for Pearson in the process of making new 
markets—framed as ‘Gen Z’ market-consumer subjectivities—and in the 
production of platform products that might be exchanged in those markets. 
Market valuation 
Making new markets in education is a highly complex accomplishment demanding 
significant expertise, networks and relations (Verger et al, 2017). Market-making 
actors, or ‘marketizing agencies’, include both human and nonhuman entities that 
‘take part in the action and in the cognitive process’, and need to be understood as 
heterogeneous ‘socio-technical arrangements’ that collectively participate in 
market-making (Çalışkan and Callon, 2010, p.9). The study of the sociotechnical 
arrangement of market-making agencies requires attention to the ‘diversity of 
competencies, knowledge, know-how, material resources and forms of 
organization of the agencies involved in a market’, and especially of their 
‘calculating capacities’ in ‘processes of valuation, that is to say of participating in 
calculation of the relative values of goods’ (p.11).     
Pearson has established itself as a powerful marketizing agency in HE. It has 
assembled an array of cognitive and technical expertise, knowledge, and calculating 
equipment to enact its digital transformation. Part of its know-how is political. Sir 
Michael Barber, a former McKinsey’s consultant and Prime Ministerial adviser in 
the UK, was the Chief Education Adviser for Pearson from 2012, overseeing its 
digital transformation, before taking up the post of Chair of the Office for 
Students (OfS), the new ‘arms length’ HE regulator for the UK, in 2017. Barber’s 
movement across private and public offices demonstrates how Pearson has sought 
to secure political advantage as a market-making agency.  
Pearson also brings novel kinds of practical methodological know-how and 
technical expertise into HE—both human experts who know how to engage with 
complex digital technologies and data, and nonhuman information technologies 
and calculative equipment required for the production and analysis of complex 
large datasets (Williamson, 2016). For example, in 2017 it produced a collaborative 
research project with the innovation charity Nesta and the Oxford Martin School 
on ‘the future of skills’ required by students for employment in 2030, which it 
presented both as an interactive website and a detailed report complete with 
extensive data visualizations (https://futureskills.pearson.com/). The research 
‘introduces a novel mixed-methods approach to prediction that combines expert 
human judgement with machine learning, allowing us to understand more complex 
dependencies’ and to ‘exploit this enhanced capability’ for future forecasting 
(Bakshi et al, 2017, p. 9). As a market-making agency Pearson has brought together 
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considerable expert know-how—both human judgment and nonhuman machine 
learning—into the production of educational predictions. This sociotechnical 
production of predictions, as a market imaginary to be pursued for financial 
investments and profitable return, has produced intelligence which Pearson is able 
to use for its own organizational purposes as it produces and positions new digital 
platforms to serve the needs of its (predicted) market.  
Pearson’s capacity to make markets is also achieved through direct investment 
expertise. In 2019 it launched its own $50m venture capital investment fund, 
Pearson Ventures, to ‘invest in companies building new market opportunities using 
innovative business models, future technologies, and new educational experiences’, 
claiming that while it would ‘pursue competitive financial returns, equally 
important is its ability to collect shareable insights and drive organizational learning 
to help future-proof the company’ (https://www.pearson.com/corporate/about-
pearson/innovation/pearson-venture-fund.html). In this sense, Pearson is not only 
investing in new market opportunities, but making new markets for products for 
purposes of extending its own cognitive capacities for organizational learning and 
future-proofing. In these ways, Pearson has assembled the necessary 
entrepreneurial, cognitive, practical and methodological expertise to define and 
enumerate the value of HE and digital products, and is also actively intervening in 
emerging markets by funding startups for its own long-term organizational learning 
and market advantage. 
Customer value 
The third key market-making dynamic for Pearson is developing new consumer 
products that deliver value for customers. Çalışkan and Callon (2010, p.14) 
highlight how the encounter between producers and consumers in a market is 
always mediated by ‘encountering devices’ which frame and format how the 
different agents ‘meet each other’. The sociotechnical arrangements orchestrating 
these encounters often consist of ‘machines, software, material devices and human 
beings whose activities [are] entangled and interconnected’ (p.15). Platforms are 
ideally suited to making market encounters possible, because they act as 
‘intermediary’ devices ‘that bring together different users’, such as customers, 
service providers, producers, and suppliers, in dedicated marketplaces (Srnicek, 
2017, p.43).  
Pearson seeks to frame and mediate the encounter between itself and its customers 
in multiple ways. By participating in trade events around the world, it stages market 
encounters with potential customers, while its website advertises various webinars 
where the benefits and value to institutions of its various products are presented. 
These devices and spaces of marketization enable Pearson to build market relations 
with the sector. Its dedicated platform products, the Global Learning Platform and 
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OPM, are paradigmatic intermediary devices for enabling market encounters, by 
restructuring the market relations between HE providers and HE users, with 
Pearson mediating those connections and benefitting financially from the 
interactions and transactions that take place. 
A key aspect of such market encounters is ‘price-setting’, or the fixing of a price 
through ‘various tools, procedures, machines, instruments or, more generally, 
devices’ that enable products and services to be translated into ‘monetary amounts’ 
(Çalışkan and Callon, 2010, p. 17). Pearson is in a price-setting struggle with other 
online program management (OPM) market competitors, leading to novel forms 
of pricing where OPM providers invest in institutions, providing financial support 
for the costs of building online learning programs, and both the institution and the 
company gain from enrolment fees if the programs are successful, with the 
company taking around 50-60% as its return on investment (McKenzie, 2018). 
With universities in the US and UK especially moving toward increased distance 
learning provision, Pearson has targeted institutions in these countries as a key part 
of its market growth strategy, developing new price-setting instruments to lubricate 
its encounters with customers. 
As already seen, Pearson has also moved to a direct-to-consumer business model. 
This is based in part on its market intelligence about Gen Z student-consumers, 
but also on calculations about purchasing/renting costs for those consumers and 
running costs for the company. A major catalyst of its digital transformation was 
the company’s declining sales of textbooks as students opted to ‘rent’ books more 
cheaply from Amazon instead (Waterson, 2019). Pearson has established what it 
views as value-for-money prices that it can bring to the direct market encounter 
with students, with carefully calculated ‘price points’ designed to disincentivize 
textual rental and incentivize digital streaming of educational content and resources 
(McKenzie, 2019).  
Pearson is making two significant price-setting moves in its market encounters 
with customers. First, it is adapting to the market logics of online streaming 
services, and treating students as a direct-to-consumer market. Second, as an OPM 
vendor, it is investing in institutional efforts to create successful distance learning 
programs, and generating profitable returns when fee-paying students are attracted 
to those offerings. As such, Pearson is involved in multiple forms of market 
encounter with its diverse customers. It is meeting students directly through its 
online Global Learning Platform as a value-for-money content provider; building 
long-term partnerships with institutions, lubricated by its investments and its 
delivery of OPM services; and it is mediating the market encounter between 
students and universities, by offering the digital platform products where students 
pay fees for an educational service and Pearson claims financial returns from those 
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transactions. Edu-business platforms have become key mediators of market 
encounters between providers and users of HE, giving companies such as Pearson 
potential commercial advantage in the competition for market share over the 
sector. This also gives it performative advantage to change the very nature of the 
relationship between universities and students, by translating pedagogy into 
increasingly transactional exchanges mediated by for-profit platform services. 
Labour market valuation 
A significant part of Pearson’s market-making activity is its valuation of skills and 
educational outcomes to labour markets. Labour markets are themselves products 
of a process of pacifying human beings and making them amenable to calculation 
and prediction (Çalışkan and Callon, 2010, p.6). From this perspective, a task of 
higher education is to render students calculable so that their fit to labour markets 
can be predicted and acted upon. The task of calculating how to align HE to 
labour markets has become a core strategy of Pearson, as it has ‘committed to both 
designing products for, and evaluating impact on, a wider range of outcomes 
including skills to support learners’ career readiness and employability prospects’ 
(Pearson, 2018a, p.30), and assembled a ‘career readiness and employability’ strand 
of services, leadership, research, white papers and products dedicated to redefining 
the relationship between education and the workplace 
(https://www.pearson.com/us/higher-education/why-choose-pearson/thought-
leadership/career-readiness-employability.html). In so doing it is ‘helping meet the 
needs of industry and government in tackling the skills gap—a growing global 
productivity challenge’ (Pearson, 2018a, p.30). In short, by ascribing future value to 
jobs—for students, industry and government alike—it is intervening in making 
labour markets. 
Another key way Pearson is making future labour markets is through horizon-
scanning, foresight and predictive algorithms. Its Future of Skills collaboration 
produced extensive predictions about future labour markets using machine 
learning, trend analysis, foresight methods, and ‘employment microdata’ to rank 
the future demand for occupations. The project involved training ‘a machine-
learning classifier to generate predictions for all occupations, making use of a 
detailed data set of 120 skills, abilities and knowledge features’; occupations were 
then ‘selected by the algorithm itself’ in order to determine ‘which skills, abilities 
and knowledge features were most associated … with rising or declining 
occupations’ (Bakhshi et al, 2017, p.29). Its ‘results provide broad support for 
policy and practitioner interest in so-called 21st century skills in both the US and 
the UK’, which it identifies as ‘interpersonal skills, higher-order cognitive skills and 
systems skills’ as well as ‘broad-based knowledge’ (p. 14). This study, then, 
produced predictive algorithms to make data-inferred forecasts about occupational 
demand and analyses of the skills and knowledge most associated with highly-
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ranked or ‘rising’ occupations. In this way, it constructed an algorithmic prediction 
of labour markets, which Pearson has subsequently sought to make ‘actionable’ by 
producing products for ‘career-driven learning’ and employability (Pearson, 2018a).  
Another way Pearson is making labour markets is discursively. Through a 
collaboration with JFF (Jobs for the Future), a US think tank that ‘accelerates the 
alignment and transformation of the American workforce and education systems 
to ensure access to economic advancement for all’ (https://www.jff.org), Pearson 
released Demand Driven Education: Merging work and learning to develop the human skills 
that matter in 2018. Reiterating the Future of Skills findings, the report promotes 
specific transformations to the HE system required to promote new skills 
outcomes and workforce development in the US and UK. If earlier HE reforms 
had focused on widening access and improving academic success, ‘demand driven 
education’ would ‘focus more strongly than ever on ensuring graduates are job-
ready and have access to rewarding careers over the course of their lifetime’ 
(Deegan & Martin, 2018, p.7). Its conclusions are that HE needs to ‘develop and 
measure skills’ that are ‘most in demand’ through ‘dynamic and work-based 
pedagogy’; ‘ensure continuous alignment’ with labour markets; create flexible 
opportunities for students ‘to rapidly convert learning to earning’; and enable 
industry to collaborate in HE provision (Deegan & Martin, 2018, p.8). These 
demands are central to Pearson’s efforts to make new labour markets. Demand 
Driven Education even highlights the potential of using AI-based ‘predictive talent 
analytics’ to match students to career paths, which would entail automated, 
algorithmic making of labour markets. 
Through these modes of labour market-making, Pearson has sought to establish 
much closer alignment of HE to industry. Throughout, certain economic 
assumptions about structural changes to the economy, most notably from 
automation itself, act as reference points for these recommendations. As a strategic 
priority, ‘Pearson is connecting the dots between students and employers, ensuring 
learners have the skills they need to excel in their career and employers have the 
people they need for a rapidly changing workplace’ (Pearson, 2018a, p. 57). In the 
performative sense of market sociology, Pearson is integrally involved in making 
labour markets by anticipating workforce demand and projecting how future 
education will build ‘pipelines’ between learning and earning, and then by 
promoting new products, as market devices, to ensure those pipelines are joined-
up.  
Performance evaluation 
The final way Pearson makes and maintains markets is by providing platform 
services that enable university customers to enhance their performance evaluation 
metrics and thus demonstrate comparative advantage and value over competitors 
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in HE markets. As HE has become more marketized, the numerical evaluation of 
‘performance’ has become a key way of rating and ranking institutions, courses, 
staff and faculties, and then of intervening to make them perform better in a 
competitive marketplace—in short, of making them more valuable (Espeland & 
Sauder, 2016).  
Pearson’s marketing materials emphasize its commitment to increasing HE 
performance. Through its ‘full-service approach to creating online degree programs 
or individual learning solutions’, Pearson’s online learning services are presented as 
streamlined technical systems and standardized program management packages for 
universities in order to ‘help you expand access, reach each student, and improve 
achievement’. Specifically, Pearson claims that programs launched on its OPM 
platform have ‘proven to be in demand by the labour market and prospective 
learner’, plus that they help institutions ‘improve your rankings by elevating your 
brain regionally and nationally’, and strengthen ‘market awareness’ to boost 
universities’ reputational advantage (https://www.pearson.com/us/higher-
education/products-services-institutions/online-program-management.html). 
Pearson has even produced a downloadable white paper on OPM and a guide to 
‘building a competitive online program’ that will ‘consistently determine online 
program success or failure in today’s marketplace’ 
(https://www.pearson.com/us/1/online-program-management-ebook-
form.html). Many universities in the US and UK have signed long-term 10-year 
deals with the company’s online program management platform. Its 2018 annual 
report indicates 57 existing institutional customers with a ‘pipeline’ of future 
partnerships and contractual agreements. These long-term agreements ultimately 
‘lock-in’ universities to for-profit platforms by creating new dependencies of public 
institutions on private transnational capital. 
Pearson’s online learning platforms will also be able to provide the kind of fine-
grained student data that conventional universities cannot collect without the 
platforms, in ways which reflect the dominant policy emphasis on performance 
metrics in both of its core markets in the US and UK (Williamson, 2018). As in 
those policy spaces and markets, the key criteria of performance for Pearson is 
based on employability metrics, career-readiness and workplace alignment, in 
particular with reference to the future skills demands of the ‘talent economy’. US 
and UK policies prioritize ‘graduate tracer studies’ and ‘graduate outcomes’ 
assessed in terms of earnings as key metrics of university performance. Pearson is 
now focused on making HE performance calculable according to the long-term 
labour market performance of graduates. Through its work on future skills and 
changing occupational demand, Pearson is shifting perceptions of what constitutes 
‘valuable’ learning, redefining the value of HE in terms of employability, and 
seeking to reshape HE to deliver better value to students and to labour markets. 
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In these ways, Pearson is providing digital services, data analytics capacity and 
discursive guidance to universities on improving their measurable performance. Its 
digital platforms make HE more measurable, comparable and amenable to 
intervention strategies, all premised on the incentive of accelerated success 
measures and improved performance rankings in the competitive HE market. 
Through its digital transformation, Pearson has therefore become a key agent of 
HE performance evaluation by providing (and ‘locking-in’ institutions to) the 
platforms required for measurement, thereby redefining what constitutes a valuable 
course in terms of its measurable performance on student employability and labour 
market readiness metrics.  
Conclusion 
Pearson is a major multinational, multibillion dollar market-making organization in 
education, deploying digital products and platforms in ways that are restructuring 
higher education to emulate and enact market processes. It illustrates how digital 
platforms have become novel ‘market devices’, supported by market strategies in 
the global HE industry, which are increasingly aligning HE with the digital 
economy (Robertson, 2019). Although HE has long been affected by processes of 
evaluation and ranking (Espeland & Sauder, 2016), digital platforms bring HE into 
practices of valuation and value extraction derived from ‘platform capitalism’, 
where platforms have become economic engines based on the extraction, analysis 
and use of large-scale data (Srnicek, 2017). As Sellar (2017, p. 349) notes, 
commercial technology actors are increasingly ‘making markets for data-driven 
products and services’ in education and simultaneously generating ‘synthetic data 
generated within and by public institutions as a resource for product development’.  
Understood as performative market devices that have to be made through 
significant effort to do things, compel actions, change organizational behaviours 
and elicit practical effects (Muniesa et al, 2007), digital platforms and data 
extraction have become central to how new markets are made in higher education, 
and to the reshaping of HE as a market-like sector. The wider global education 
industry is integrally involved in the marketization of higher education, especially 
as companies such as Pearson pivot to become platform edu-businesses modelling 
themselves on the dominant logics of contemporary platform capitalism. As in the 
digital economy where data are key sources of value and capital generation, the 
global higher education industry is ‘seeing like a market’ (Fourcade & Healy, 2017) 
through the painstaking micro-processes of making myriad markets, producing 
valuations based on data, and then extracting value from the data and capitalizing 
on the opportunities that result. HE marketization is actively being accomplished 
through a complex sociotechnical arrangement of market devices including 
platforms, as well as the numbers and charts, human and nonhuman agents, 
machine learning algorithms, visualizations and infographics, market valuations, 
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reports and discourses that all support the construction, maintenance and diffusion 
of those platforms.  
What wider critical implications for HE itself emerge from the market devices and 
strategies of global education industry actors such as Pearson? One is the question 
of governance. Platforms are becoming central to how universities are organized, 
managed, and measured. Online learning platforms such as those market devices 
of Pearson allow data about teaching and learning processes to be extracted and 
analysed in near real-time, and used to reinforce policy and regulatory priorities 
around performance audits, risk analysis, and comparison, whereby the HE sector 
itself is treated as a competitive market of institutions seeking advantage in national 
and international contests (Williamson, 2019). Second, platforms enable 
‘automated data representation in education’ whereby computational models of 
learning, ‘“owned” by a small elite of data experts driven by technical mindsets and 
commercial incentives, superimpose multiple layers of algorithmic complexity on 
stripped down (and highly contentious) understandings of human learning’ 
(Perrotta and Selwyn, 2019, p. 4). The market-making involved in expanding digital 
platforms and platform edu-businesses in education, in other words, ultimately 
stands to shape how processes of learning are apprehended and acted upon.  
Following from this, third, platforms stand to displace the practice of teaching to 
‘robot pedagogies’, redeploying some aspects of curriculum organization, teaching 
and assessment to increasingly capable machines that can analyse student data in 
real time, make automated recommendations and adapt to ‘personalize’ the 
pedagogic experience (Zeide, 2019). The introduction of platforms into education 
generates automated rhythms of activity to which educators have to respond and 
adapt. Platforms also transform pedagogic relationships into market exchanges and 
transactions, mediated through for-profit edu-business platforms that take a ‘cut’ 
of the fee while also benefitting from the extraction of transactional data between 
students and educators on the platform. Fourth, as they are aligned with demands 
of employability and career-readiness as key HE metrics, platforms are positioned 
to accelerate the pipeline from ‘learning to earning’, or ‘major to wages’, thereby 
conflating the evaluation of university performance with the valuation of 
universities’ contribution to labour markets (Busch, 2017).  
Fifth, and finally, digital platforms create new dependencies for public universities 
on the private for-profit infrastructures that constitute platform capitalism. Srnicek 
(2017) claims platforms have become key infrastructures of society by undergirding 
social relations, economic transactions, cultural experiences, and political 
discourses. As an infrastructural underlay to HE, digital platforms ‘lock-in’ 
universities to the dynamics of platform capitalism by fusing an ever-increasing 
array of HE functions and tasks to proprietary software systems, code, and 
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algorithms. In these ways, HE is being incorporated into the market devices of 
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